Since independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) became key actors in European regula--tory governance in the 1990s, a significant share of policy---making has been carried out by organizations that are neither democratically elected nor directly accountable to elected politicians. In this context, communication plays an important role. On the one hand, communication may contribute to the accountability of regulatory agen--cies and thereby help them to mitigate their democratic deficit. On the other hand, communication may be used to steer the behaviour of the regulated industry when more coercive regulatory means are unfeasible or undesirable. However, empirical research focusing directly on how regulators communicate is virtually non---existent.
Introduction
The phenomenon of "denationalization" presented in the introduction to this special issue does not stem only from the reallocation of sovereignty from nation---states to less representative supranational institutions and the growing importance of urban and regional politics. The large---scale "sideward" process of delegation of decision--making capacity towards unelected bodies is also intimately related to denationaliza--tion, at least with respect to two of its dimensions: the formation of these bodies is largely the outcome of a global diffusion process (Jordana et al. 2011 ) and, once es--tablished, these bodies join transnational networks of regulators (Slaughter 2004) , which enjoy partially autonomous policy---making capacity. The role of elected politi--cians in the regulatory process is becoming less relevant, in favour of the influence of "non---majoritarian" technocrats that are working at arm's length from representative institutions (Majone 1996; Thatcher and Stone Sweet 2002) .
The most important type of unelected actors operating at domestic level are independent regulatory agencies (IRAs), which have been established in Western Europe and beyond, covering sectors such as financial services, electricity, telecom--munications, broadcasting and many others (Gilardi 2005b; Gilardi 2008; Jordana, Levi---Faur and i Marín 2011; Levi---Faur 2003) . By design, they were entrusted with statutory independence from the pressures of political decision---makers to secure the credibility and stability of regulatory policies, and to reinforce decision---making effi--ciency through technical expertise (Majone 1994b; Majone 2001a; Majone 2001b) . Poli--ticians delegated crucial regulatory functions to IRAs: goal formulation, rule making, and standard setting; monitoring and control, information gathering, scrutiny, su--pervision, inspection, audit, and evaluation; enforcement, behaviour modification, adjudication, and the application of rewards and sanctions (Christensen and Laegreid 2001; Hood, Rothstein and Baldwin 2001) .
IRAs have been quite extensively studied from the point of view of their crea--tion, diffusion, independence, performance and accountability (Carpenter 2001; Christensen and Laegreid 2006; Coen and Thatcher 2005; Gilardi 2007; Gilardi 2004; Gilardi 2005a; Gilardi 2008; Jordana and Levi---Faur 2004; Jordana and Levi---Faur 2005; Levi---Faur 2003; Levi---Faur 2006a; Maggetti 2012; Maggetti 2007; Maggetti 2009; Thatcher 2002a; Thatcher 2002b; Thatcher 2005) . This body of research pointed to the fact that IRAs represent the "third force" in regulation, besides politicians and the regulated industries, that they mostly enjoy formal and de facto independence, and that they can influence law---making in their area of competence, while also being em--bedded in complex accountability relationships with different types of actors.
However, the communication of IRAs has been largely neglected by both reg--ulatory governance and political communication scholars so far. While the former rarely recognized merit in connecting research on regulation and accountability with the question of communication, the latter primarily examined the media coverage of politics or, if interested in political actors at all, the communication of political par--ties, governments and elected officials only (Puppis and Maggetti 2012) . Neverthe--less, in this paper we argue that there are good reasons for shedding light on how these organizations are communicating. Following Black (2008) , it can be argued that communication contributes to the accountability of regulatory agencies and may thereby help them to mitigate their inherent deficit in democratic legitimacy. Moreo--ver, regulatory communication can also be conceptualized as an instrument of indus--try regulation (Black 2002; Majone 1997; Yeung 2005) . In this paper we thus ask the questions of how communication is organized across different agencies, how IRAs are communicating with political actors, the regulated industry and the public at large, and what their communication is about content---wise.
To tackle these questions, this paper uses a compound research design (Levi---Faur 2006b ) in order to compare the communication of regulatory agencies in four countries (United Kingdom, Germany, Ireland and Switzerland) and three sectors (financial services, telecommunications and broadcasting). The empirical analysis is based on twenty---three qualitative semi---structured interviews with representatives of IRAs and industry associations as well as on a quantitative content analysis of IRAs' media releases. Results indicate that, while the organization of communication fol---lows a national pattern approach, a policy sector approach is helpful for understand--ing the use of communication as a soft tool of regulation. In the following, we present the theoretical framework of the study (section 2) and discuss the methods employed (section 3). Following an overview of the empirical results (section 4), we engage in the interpretation and discussion of these results (section 5) before coming to a con--clusion (section 6).
Theory and hypotheses
Considering the importance of IRAs - some authors even claim that the real work in running democracies is now done by unelected actors such as independent regula--tors (Vibert 2007 ) -it can be reasonably be expected that the news media report about significant decisions, changes, failures and scandals of IRAs as they do for oth--er political actors. Past research on environmental protection in the United States has shown that the press actually covers the actions of regulatory agencies more com--prehensively than expected. The media are however selective. They focus on regula--tory actions that have a direct impact on the public, namely when regulatory policies affect everyday life, shift policy in novel directions, or result in policy failure (Coglianese and Howard 1998) . What is more, the analysis of the media coverage of competition agencies in Switzerland and the UK suggested that such coverage, while confined to the most salient policy issues, follows the regulatory cycle quite coherent--ly (Maggetti 2012) . It thus can be argued that IRAs "are not inclined to dismiss the role of the press" (Coglianese and Howard 1998, p.41), if not even under pressure to engage in political communication. This argumentation is in line with scholarly de--bates about the so---called mediation and mediatisation of politics. Not only do the mass media mediate between citizens and political institutions, making political communication an integral part of politics and a necessary prerequisite for the func--tioning of any political system (Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999) . Political actors are also said to adapt to, and to adopt, a "media logic" (Altheide and Snow 1988; Mazzoleni 2008; Strömbäck and Esser 2009 ). themselves might play for communication (Jarren and P. 2011) , we also explore the questions of how communication is organized across different regulatory agencies, how IRAs are communicating with political actors, the regulated industry and the public at large, as well as what agencies are communicating about. To sum up, we are focusing on the structures of the communication divisions of IRAs, their target groups, instruments and goals, as well as the content of their media releases.
Any comparative study first seeks to uncover regularities in the observed phenomena. The starting point of our inquiry is thus the identification of systematic patterns of regulatory communication. In the literature on regulatory governance, it is commonplace to distinguish between a "national pattern approach" and a "policy sector approach" (Levi---Faur 2006b ). According to the former, national---level charac--teristics, such as political institutions and actor's constellations greatly vary across countries and are expected to explain the variation in the design and behaviour of regulatory agencies. Following the latter instead, policy sectors are populated by dis--tinctive policy communities with their own political, economic and technological fea--tures. Thus, the design and behaviour of regulatory agencies is expected to be fun--damentally similar within sectors, irrespective of the national context. In that regard, previous research on political communication points to the fact that both the com--munication of political actors and news coverage are conditional on structural and cultural dimensions of media systems and political systems (Esser and Strömbäck 2012; Pfetsch and Esser 2012; Plasser and Plasser 2002) . Accordingly, we expect the organization of communication and the communication activities of IRAs to be main--ly shaped by national conditions.
• Hypothesis 1: Regulatory communication is more likely to follow national than sectoral patterns (if any).
The second step is to make sense of these patterns. On the one hand, regula--tors could use communication mainly to gain accountability. Following Black (2008) , communication contributes to the accountability of regulatory agencies and thereby helps them to mitigate their inherent deficit in democratic legitimacy. Precisely be--cause of this "democratic deficit", they will actively seek to become more accountable and secure their organizational persistence. There exist indeed arguments according to which the media constitute an important element of a "multi---pronged system of controls" that should allow agencies to become accountable while not interfering with their independence (Majone 1994a; Majone 1998; Majone 1999) . Following this argument, agencies are expected to put considerable emphasis on communication to reach the audiences that could challenge their legitimacy. There is no consensus in the few studies dealing with this topic on whether these communication activities are driven by the need to demonstrate effectiveness to their "principals" (Deacon and Monk 2001) , or if are they directly targeting broader audiences and the public at large (Yeung 2009 ). Of course, it is also possible that agencies aim at both targets at the same time. On the other hand, regulatory communication can also be conceptualized as an instrument of industry regulation. Regulatory conversations, i.e. the private communications between IRAs and regulated firms (Black 2002) , are not the only communicative possibilities to regulate the industry. Rather, publicity management and public communication may also be seen as a tool of regulation (Yeung 2005) .
Seen in this light, regulatory communication via the media may be directed at the regulated industry and aim at steering the behaviour of those being regulated when more coercive means are unfeasible or undesirable in order to promote compliance, as suggested by numerous works on "soft" governance modes (Majone 1997 ).
• Hypothesis 3: Regulators are expected to use communication via the media as an instrument of industry regulation.
Methods
To explore these hypotheses, this paper uses a compound research design (Levi---Faur 2006b ) in order to compare the communication of regulatory agencies in four coun--tries and three sectors. This stepwise comparative approach combines cross---national and cross---sectoral comparison to identify and explain similarities and differences.
The selected cases are regulators for financial services, telecommunication and broadcasting in the United Kingdom, Germany, Ireland and Switzerland (see appen--dix 1). They were selected by employing a purposeful sampling strategy to maximise variation among both sectors and countries. The three selected sectors differ in terms of the internationalization of their markets (high for finance, medium for telecom and comparatively lower for broadcasting). What is more, telecommunication and broad--casting are network---based industries, exhibiting technically similar problems of in--terconnectedness and cross---border issues, and presenting public interest concerns, but we expect broadcasting to be more politically sensitive precisely considering the mediatisation of politics. The financial sector is also politically salient, structurally resilient to national regulation and more sensitive to systemic risks.
Regarding variation across countries, it can be reasonably argued that typolo--gies of media systems help in identifying differences that are relevant for political communication. On the one hand, according to Hallin and Mancini's (2004) now seminal typology of media systems, Germany and Switzerland belong to the demo--cratic---corporatist model while the United Kingdom and Ireland are part of the liberal model. Media pressure seems higher in the liberal model because of commercializa--tion. One may also expect media in the democratic---corporatist model to be more sen--sitive to IRAs' communication on technical matters than more commercialized me--dia. On the other hand, Ireland and Switzerland are small media systems confronted with next---door big neighbours sharing the same language (Lowe and Nissen 2011; Puppis et al. 2009 ). Both political tradition and market size shape the media systems of the four selected countries and can be expected to affect the political communica--tion of regulatory agencies.
The comparison is on the one hand based on twenty---three qualitative semi--structured interviews (Kvale 1996; Mason 2002) with both representatives of the reg--ulatory agencies (mostly heads of media relations or strategic communication) and trade associations of the regulated industries (mostly heads of regulatory affairs, public affairs or media relations). During the interviews the organization of commu--nication within the regulator (structures of the responsible division), the relationship of the regulator to the media and the regulated industry as well as communication activities (instruments, content, target groups, objectives) were discussed (appendix 2). The semi---structured interviews were conducted in spring and summer 2012 and lasted between 60 and 120 minutes. Interviews are not considered as a way to simply excavate facts but as a reconstruction of knowledge. Hence, the interviews were sub--ject to an interpretative analysis using a method of inductive content categorization (Mason 2002; Mayring 2007) . This method requires to inductively develop a categori--zation for text excerpts (which was done with the aid of the software MAXQDA) be--fore interpreting the text passages in light of the theoretical background.
On the other hand, in order to get fine---grained insights into IRAs' communi--cation activities, a quantitative content analysis of media releases issued by these or--ganizations was performed. All media releases issued in 2011 and 2012 by the inves--tigated IRAs were collected. Given the total number of media releases and especially the variance between regulators, a stratified random sampling with disproportionate allocation was done. The quota depends on the number of media releases an agency issued (1---30: 100%; 31---100: 50%, 101---300: 25%; >300: 15%). The media releases them--selves were randomly selected. Eventually, a stratified sample of 362 media releases was analysed (see appendix 3 for details and a description of the sample). This analy--sis covered the subject of media releases, potential justifications given for regulatory action, the main actor addressed in the releases, and whether a regulatory intent is identifiable (see appendix 4 for coding examples).
In the next section, the empirical results of will be presented using the above--mentioned stepwise comparative approach by first comparing regulatory communi--cation across countries in the different sectors and then outlining cross---sectoral dif--ferences and similarities. Section 5 then examines explanations for these results.
Empirical Results
This empirical analysis of regulatory communication focuses on the organization of communication and on the communication activities of IRAs, and proceeds through the comparative inspection of similarities and differences across countries and sec--tors.
Organization of Communication
Comparing the organization of communication across countries in the three analysed sectors reveals both differences and commonalities (see Table  1 ).
Looking at financial regulators, the interviews showed clear differences be--tween bigger and smaller countries. While the financial regulators in the UK and Germany have big separate communication divisions (72 and 21 persons respective--ly), the regulator's general secretariat (12 and 15 persons respectively) is also respon--sible for communicative tasks in Switzerland and Ireland. A common feature of all four regulators is that these general secretariats and communication divisions report directly to the chairperson or another member of the executive committee. This prox--imity to top---level management is considered crucial by interviewees for effective communication. Moreover, communication in all four cases needs to be coordinated with the respective central bank.
The picture in telecommunications is very similar. Again, there are clear differ--ences between regulators in big and small countries. The regulators in the UK and Germany have a specialized communication division (20 and 11 persons respective---ly). In Ireland, the one person responsible for communication is part of the corporate services division, in Switzerland the general secretariat (3 persons) also takes care of communication. They all directly report to the executive management.
In broadcasting, however, we find a slightly different situation. While the regu--lators in the UK, Germany and Switzerland have a specialized division for commu--nication, the Irish regulator does not. Rather, that organization has a "matrix struc--ture" in place. With the exception of the UK's single regulator (20 persons) these di--visions tend to be rather small (around 3 persons). The situation in Germany is a spe--cial one due to the responsibility of the Länder in broadcasting. Each state media au--thority does its own communication. In addition, the newly established joint man--agement office in Berlin also has its own press office. The persons responsible for communication directly report to the executive management in all countries.
The cross---sectoral comparison of IRA's organization of communication mainly reveals commonalities (see Table  2 ).
In the United Kingdom, all regulators feature big and separate communication divisions that report directly to the executive management. The situation in Germany is very similar (with broadcasting being an exception regarding the size of divisions, given the responsibility of the Bundesländer for broadcasting regulation). While there are no separate communication divisions within Irish regulators, the persons responsible for communication directly report to the executive management as well.
And in Switzerland, aside from the broadcasting regulator having a dedicated com--munication division, the situation is similar. The only remarkable cross---sectoral vari--ation is the fact that financial regulators need to coordinate their communication with central banks (Ireland being a special case, as the financial regulator was re--unified with the central bank recently).
Communication Activities
As with the organization of communication, a cross---national comparison of regula--tors' communication activities shows both differences and commonalities in the ana--lysed sectors (see Table  3 ).
Financial regulators feature many commonalities across countries. Regulators and industry representatives agree that communication is mainly about informing the general public, the industry and financial analysts about decisions and positions of the regulator via mainstream media (including the financial press), trade publica--tions and news agencies. Moreover, all four organizations also use their communica--tion towards the media with a regulatory intent to communicate expectations, i.e. to let the industry know how they should behave and that forthcoming inspections will focus on certain issues. Yet there are also some differences in their communication activities. In contrast to Switzerland and Ireland, the regulators in the UK and Ger--many clearly state that they do not wish to participate in political debates via the media and that all communication with the political system is done directly by the executive committee. Moreover, while all regulators are aware that financial regula--tors have lost a lot of confidence because of the economic crisis, not all of them ac--tively try to rebuild their reputation. In contrast to their Irish and British counter--parts, the German and Swiss regulators argue that confidentiality considerations re--strict their possibilities to talk about enforcement action that would help their reputa--tion. Finally, with respect to regulation by communication, the regulators in Ireland and the UK also make use of naming & shaming techniques to influence the behav--iour of the industry. Such communication is thought to punish firms in breach of rules but also to deter others from misbehaving.
Interviewees from both IRAs and industry associations state that telecommuni--cation regulators use communication mainly to inform about their decisions and posi--tions via mainstream media, trade publications and news agencies. The political sys---tem is the only group targeted by all organizations. Moreover, none of the interview--ees assumes that communication is used with a regulatory intent in mind. However, there are also noticeable differences across countries. The Irish regulator seems to be an exception as it mainly targets the political system and is said to be less interested in media attention. The regulators in the UK, Germany and Switzerland also target the general public and the regulated industry. The communication goals of the Ger--man and the British regulator are said to go beyond mere information as they put a stronger emphasis on managing their reputation and promoting their activities.
Looking at broadcasting, all regulators aim at informing the general public, the industry and the political system about their decisions and actions using mainstream media, trade journals and news agencies. Yet there are also considerable differences in the communication activities across countries. First, Switzerland and Germany interviewees state that the regulators' mediated communication also targets the polit--ical system. Industry representatives in the UK and Ireland share that view, yet the British and Irish regulators disagree. Second, in the UK and Germany reputation management seems to be a goal of communication in addition to information. The industry in the UK mentions that the regulator wants to be perceived as effective.
And in Germany even "giving issues a spin" is considered part of the communica--tion. Finally, only in Germany regulators claim to use communication as a tool of regulation by both communicating expectations towards the industry and using naming and shaming techniques.
--------- Table  3 about here---------
The comparison of communication activities across sectors shows several commonal--ities and variations as well (see Table  4 ).
In the United Kingdom all analysed regulators target the general public, the regulated industry and financial analysts via mainstream media, trade journals and news agencies to inform about decisions and positions but also to manage their repu---tation. The main difference is that only the financial regulator uses communication as a tool of regulation in the view of both agencies and industry representatives.
While all German regulators aim at informing the public and the industry about decisions and positions, their target groups differ. Additionally, the telecom--munication and broadcasting regulators are said to use communication not only for information but also for building reputation. While communication is used with a regulatory intent in both the financial and the broadcasting sector, this does not seem to be the case in telecommunications.
Differences between sectors are most pronounced in Ireland. This is mainly due to the fact that the telecommunication regulator is mostly focused on the politi--cal system and non---mediated communication, whereas the other organizations also target the general public and the industry. In the financial sector building reputation after the crisis is an important aim in addition to information and the regulator also makes use of both naming and shaming and communicating expectations towards the regulated industry.
In Switzerland, the communication activities regulators in the different sectors feature many similarities. They aim at informing the general public, the industry and the political system about their decisions and positions via mainstream media, trade journals and news agencies. However, the financial regulator, as in the other coun--tries, also targets analysts, makes use of the financial press and communicates expec--tations towards the regulated industry.
--------- Table  4 about here---------
The content analysis confirms that information about decisions of the regula--tory agency, as well as about other actions (such as the beginning of a consultation or a tender), are by far the most important subjects of communication (see Table  5 ). Yet there are differences between sectors and countries. In telecommunications and broadcasting, information about actions of the regulator other than regulatory deci---sions are far more common (30.8% and 28.3% respectively) than in the financial sec--tor (15.7%), as there are often tenders for licenses. Media releases about the agencies themselves (reorganization, new member of the executive etc.) or about market de--velopments are less common. However, financial regulators inform about their or--ganization more often (15.0%) than telecommunication or broadcasting regulators (4.4% and 7.1% respectively) due to the recent reorganizations following the financial crisis. Moreover, in Ireland a third of releases are about the regulated sector (com--pare to 17.8% in Germany and the UK and 6.8% in Switzerland). In contrast, Swiss regulators inform more frequently about themselves (19.2%).
--------- Table  5 about here---------
The content analysis of press releases also reveals that regulators in all coun--tries and sectors offer justifications for their actions in more than 80% of media re--leases (see Table  6 ). This is particularly frequent in the UK, where as much as 99.0% of media releases contain some kind of justification, whereas in Ireland only 61.7% of media releases contain one (H(3)=50.522, p=0.000). Coherently with the previous re--sults supporting a national pattern approach, the sectoral variation is much smaller, ranging from 76.4% in broadcasting to 84.6% in telecommunications (H(2)=2.497, p=0.287).
--------- Table  6 about here---------Based on Nullmeier and Rüb (1993) it is possible to distinguish between de--scriptive justifications for action and action justified by the actors own will, expecta--tions and demands what the actor should do, as well as a (perceived) must (see Table   7 ). The vast majority of justifications are of descriptive nature only, explaining the situation, developments and the action taken. Yet in some instances, regulators clear--ly state that they acted or made a decision because they wanted to, were expected to do so, or simply because they had to. Surprisingly often, regulators claim that they had to take certain action (ranging from 7.7% in telecommunications to 13.7% in the financial sector and from 9.6% in Ireland to 16.8% in the UK).
--------- Table  7 about here---------Most media releases do not directly address specific actors (see Table  8 ). When they do so, they usually target the general public, or, less frequently, the regulated industries. The general public is more often addressed by telecommunications regu--lators and by British regulators, whereas the industry is addressed more often by broadcasting regulators and Swiss regulators.
--------- Table  8 about here---------
The results regarding the use of communication as a tool of regulation are more mixed (see Table 9 ). The content analysis shows that most media releases do not have a visible regulatory intention. When they do, however, "naming and sham--ing" in order to punish firms for breaching rules and to deter others from doing the same is often used as a strategy in the UK (28.7%) and in the financial sector (23.5%).
Regulators also communicate expectations on how the industry should behave. In contrast, threats of regulatory changes or enforcement action in case of failures to comply with existing rules are only rarely used, with the partial exception, again, of the UK (7.9%) and the financial sector (7.8%). It should be noted that even if regula--tion by information is rare, it could be important for some special cases. However, it is clearly not the main goal of regulatory communication.
--------- Table  9 about here---------Figures 1 to 4 in the fourth appendix provide more information of the analysis of press releases; they present the probability of occurrence of each coded item, that is, another way at looking at the evidence summarized in the cross---tabulations men--tioned above.
Discussion
The empirical analysis revealed both cross---sector and cross---national commonalities and variations, thus showing considerable heterogeneity. However, some interesting regularities can be observed. Therefore, all in all, our empirical analysis confirms that the media constitute an ac--countability forum for IRAs (Maggetti 2012) but, this time, from regulators' side, too.
In line with other studies, we found that IRAs actively seek to become more account--able and reinforce their legitimacy (Busuioc, Curtin and Groenleer 2011) . To be pre--cise, they pursue an accountability---seeking strategy through regulatory communica--tion by targeting broader specialized audiences and also the public at large (Yeung 2009 ). Interestingly, their "principal", that is, elected politicians, appear to constitute a less relevant target of their direct and indirect communication strategies. One rea--son for this may be that in some agencies the communication with the political sys--tem is not among the competencies of the communication division but rather done by the executive management itself. Another reason probably is that regulators dis--pose of more direct instruments to communicate with elected politicians, such as governmental hearings, parliamentary committees and regular reporting procedures.
However, since the vast majority of media releases has a justificatory intent, regula--tors seem to anticipate that the media can constitute "fire alarms" that signal to their "principal" any potential problems associated with the activity of regulators. This point is consistent with the delegation literature emphasizing that the principal does not monitor the agency using a costly "police patrol" system (Hopenhayn and Lohmann 1996; McCubbins and Schwartz 1984) . Instead, elected politicians tend to rely on external sources of information, namely the media, as "fire alarms" that solve their informational disadvantages and indicate the potential problems associated with the activity of regulators. Our results might imply that regulators are able to anticipate this "fire alarm" function of the press and actively strive to manage their relations with the media.
Third, a number of regulators use the media in addition to direct communica--tion in order to send messages to the regulated firms, pointing to the relevance of communication as a soft tool of regulation. While an explicit regulatory intent is less fre--quent in media releases, both the interviews and the content analysis reveal commu--nication via the media is sometimes used to communication expectations and to name and shame, thus partially supporting our third hypotheses. Yet in contrast to expectations, we find differences between sectors that are constant across countries.
Mainly IRAs in the financial sector make use of regulation by communication which may be explained by the recent financial crisis and a relationship between regulators and the industry that has been traditionally quite close.
Conclusion
In this paper we set out to explore the communication of independent regulatory agencies (IRAs). On the one hand, communication may contribute to the accountabil--ity of regulatory agencies and thereby help them to mitigate their democratic deficit.
On the other hand, communication may also be seen and used as a soft tool of regu--lation, when coercive means to steer the behaviour of target industries are unfeasible or undesirable. Nevertheless, there is a lack of systematic comparative work investi--gating the communication of IRAs across sectors and countries. Given this apparent need for a more thorough examination of regulatory communication, we investigat--- This study provides important insights into the communication of regulators across sectors and countries. With respect to the organization of communication within regulatory agencies, the findings clearly support a national pattern approach (Levi---Faur 2006) . In the big countries under scrutiny, the UK and Germany, regulators have specialized and rather big communication divisions while in the small countries Ireland and Switzerland resources available for communication are more modest.
This insight is in line with previous research on the relationship between media and politics, pointing to the influence of national peculiarities of media systems on politi--cal communication (Hallin and Mancini 2004; Pfetsch and Esser 2012; Esser and Strömbäck 2012a; 2012b ).
Yet results are more nuanced when focusing on communication activities. Sur--prisingly, there is no clear pattern and regulatory communication is rather similar across countries and sectors. This might be due to the fact that all regulators, irre--spective of country and sector specifics, have to respond to their inherent lack of democratic legitimacy (Gilardi 2008; Majone 1999) by using communication to raise their accountability. Empirical results confirm that regulators aim at informing the general public about their decisions and positions, and that most media releases con--tain a justification for their actions. Regulators recognized that the media can act as an important accountability forum. With respect to the use of communication as a soft tool of regulation, patterns are more systematic but concern a minority of IRAs.
Mainly regulators in the financial sector use communication in order to let the indus--try know what they expect from them and also to name and shame in the case of non---compliance, pointing to a policy sector approach (Levi---Faur 2006) .
By bringing together research on regulatory agencies and political communi--cation, the paper contributes to our knowledge of how regulatory agencies work and helps in extending political communication research beyond traditional actors of pol--icy---making. On the one hand, the paper accomplishes to shed a different light on regulators' activities. It shows how communication is both used to enhance account--ability and, to a lesser extent, to regulate the industry. So far the question of account--ability has rarely been connected to public communication and media coverage. Fu--ture research should attempt at comparing the communication of agencies with me--dia coverage and media interest in agencies across countries and sectors in order to better understand interactions between these two sides. Moreover, the use of com---munication as a tool of regulation deserves more attention in order to better under--stand its relation to other regulatory instruments.
On the other hand, the paper makes clear that in modern democracies the analysis of the relationship between media and politics cannot confine itself to tradi--tional political actors but has to include powerful regulatory agencies as well. A comparison of the political communication of agencies with other actors like political parties, governments or associations could improve our understanding how mediati--sation affects actors with different needs for public or electoral support. Additionally, in times of shrinking resources for journalism it would also be worthwhile to analyse whether journalism is capable of continuously holding regulators to account and thus fulfil its role for democracy or whether it focuses on more visible but less pow--erful political actors only. The present paper offers merely a first step towards a bet--ter understanding of the relationships between agencies, their principals, regulated firms and the media. Yet it allowed for uncovering exciting avenues for future re--search.
Table 1: Organization of Communication: Cross---National Comparison
Cross---National Commonalities Cross---National Variations
Financial Regulators
• reporting directly to executive management • coordination with Central Bank necessary
• separate division and more re--sources in UK and DE
Telecom Regulators
• reporting directly to executive management
Broadcasting Regulators
• separate division in UK, DE, CH; matrix organization in IE • bigger division in UK "ComReg obligated to develop strategy" → media release clearly states that new strategy had to be developed because of the communications act
Regulatory Intent

Name & Shame or Name & Fame
"This is Ofcom's second report looking at telecoms complaints data, which aims to provide useful information for consumers, and also to incentivise telecoms providers to improve their performance." → by informing about performance of industry, de--ter/incentivize firms "The Financial Services Authority (FSA) has today fined two former directors of Al--pha to Omega (UK) Limited" → FSA mentions their names and the fines
Communicating Expectation of Regulator to Industry
"we expect them to take a real interest in fixing this" → FSA expects industry to change sales bonus system "In advance of the forthcoming referendum … BAI has written to all broadcasters reminding them that the BAI Code on Referenda and Election Coverage applies to all reporting on the referendum" → reminding industry of their obligation Threat (if you don't act, we will)
"The Central Bank of Ireland today published its plans for a series of themed reviews and inspections during 2012. … This should allow the relevant sectors to prepare and should also help raise standards across the firms in each sector" → not only com--municating expectation but also announcing inspections so that firms know that misbehavior will be noticed and punished "Wealth management firms should be aware that the FSA is now undertaking a further review which will include assessments of systems and controls. We expect firms to heed our warn- 
